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COMMENT 
WHEN DOES eRA WFORD REACH JAILHOUSE PHONE 
CALLS THAT IMPLICATE A CO-DEFENDANT, BUT ARE 
MADE BY ANOTHER NON-TESTIFYING CO-DEFENDANT? 
By: Matthew M. Grogan 1 
INTRODUCTION 
S ixth Amendment jurisprudence has been quite amorphous in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington.2 This 
comment will explore the present state of a criminal defendant's right to 
confrontation while also introducing a potential, and most likely inevitable, 
interpretation of law awaiting Maryland appellate courts: whether jailhouse 
phone calls that are made by a non-testifying co-defendant and which 
implicate another co-defendant are "testimonial" under Crawford and its 
progeny. 
The issue arises when one co-defendant, in exercising his or her right 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, effectively overrides 
a fellow co-defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 
Indeed, the precise issue is very fact specific, and has only been addressed by 
a few jurisdictions at an appellate level. To date, all such cases have found 
the calls in question to be non-testimonial. In addition to outlining the 
rationale for such rulings, this comment will present valid counterarguments 
as to why said calls are actually testimonial in nature. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Peculiar Relationship Between Hearsay and the Corifrontation 
Clause 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmenf and Article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights4 provide criminal defendants the right to 
I I would like to thank Jerome Bivens, Esq. for suggesting the topic for this comment 
and Professor Byron Warnken for serving as my faculty advisor. I would also like to 
thank Brian Saccenti and Jennifer Caffrey of the Office of the Public Defender of 
Maryland for their invaluable research assistance. 
2541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2. 
4 See Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 103,73 A.3d 254, 263 (2013) (noting that the 
federal and Maryland right to confrontation are read "in pari materia, or as generally 
providing the same protection to defendants."). For purposes of this article, 
160 
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cross-examine witnesses who bear testimony against the accused.5 The rule 
against hearsay, a cornerstone of federal and state evidentiary rules, prohibits 
the admission of out-of-court statements that are offered "to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.,,6 
The Sixth Amendment and hearsay are intrinsically linked; implication of 
the right to confrontation necessarily involves the attempted use of an out-of-
court statement offered for its truth.7 Further, the rules of evidence allow for 
numerous hearsay exceptions, which create a "natural tension" with the 
strictures of the Confrontation Clause. 8 
B. The Supreme Court Radically Altered Its Interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment in 2004 
Prior to 2004, the Supreme Court's opinion in Ohio v. Roberts controlled 
the realm of confrontation.9 Under that standard, the admissibility of an out-
of-court statement hinged upon judicially determined "trustworthiness.,,10 
Similar to the rationale supporting the validity of hearsay exceptions, a 
defendant's right to confrontation would tum on the presence of certain 
"indicia of reliability. ,,11 
The watershed decision in Crawford v. Washington abrogated Roberts 
and fundamentally changed Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.12 Justice 
Scalia's majority opinion sought to restore the state of confrontation, 
consistent with the objectives of the Amendment's Framers. 13 
therefore, discussion of the Sixth Amendment incorporates the rights granted by the 
Maryland Constitution. 
5 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 ("[The Confrontation Clause] applies to 'witnesses' 
against the accused - in other words, those who 'bear testimony.' Testimony [is 
defmed as a] 'solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact. "') (internal citation omitted). 
6 See FED. R. EVID. 802; MD. RULE 5-801(c). 
7 Derr, 434 Md. at 106-07, 73 A.3d at 265 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59-60 n.9) 
("[T]he Confrontation Clause only applies to hearsay, or out-of-court statements 
offered and received to establish the truth of the matter asserted."). 
8 This is because an out-of-court statement has the potential to pass muster under a 
hearsay exception, yet implicate a defendant's right to confrontation. See generally 
The Honorable Paul W. Grimm, et. aI., The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay 
Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 155 (2010) 
(offering an in depth analysis of the interaction between the Confrontation Clause 
and various exceptions to the rule against hearsay). 
9 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
10 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66) (criticizing the fact 
that Roberts could be satisfied solely by the existence of a hearsay exception). 
II Id. at 42; see also Grimm, supra note 8. 
12 See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
13 See id. at 47-50 (alleging that Roberts was entirely inconsistent with the original 
intent behind the Confrontation Clause's inclusion in the Bill of Rights). The 
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The Court explained that cross-examination was the Framers' selected 
mode of assessing the reliability of a given statement; in other words, it was 
a "procedural guarantee" of reliability. 14 The problem with Roberts was that 
it essentially interpreted the right to confrontation as a "substantive 
guarantee" of reliability, leaving in the hands of the judiciary the task of 
evaluating out-of-court statements under a plethora of factors on a case-by-
case basis. 15 This led to unpredictable results and was inconsistent with the 
crux of the Sixth Amendment - cross-examination.16 
The principle concern the Framers sought to address was the use of ex 
parte testimony or its functional equivalent in criminal trials. 17 That is, 
testimony against a defendant made outside of that particuhu judicial 
proceeding, offered as evidence at trial against the accused in lieu of the 
declarant's in-court testimony. 
In light of the Amendment's history and triggered by Roberts' 
shortcomings, Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause bars admission 
of "testimonial hearsay" unless the "declarant is unavailable,,18 and "the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.,,19 
C. The Ambiguous Definition of Testimonial 
Ten years later, Crawford remains at the forefront of American 
constitutional law. This is because the Court failed to carve out a 
comprehensive definition of "testimonial,,,2o less describing three "core" 
classes of "clearly" testimonial statements: 
historic trial of Sir Walter Raleigh is today remembered for its impact on American 
constitutional law; Sir Raleigh was convicted for treason and sentenced to death 
despite demanding his right to confront his accusers in open court. Id. at 44. In 
Crawford, the Court lambasted Roberts for effectively authorizing situations akin to 
Sir Raleigh's case. Id. at 62; see infra Part VI.B.iv. 
14/d. at 61. 
15 I d. 
16Id. at 65 ("It is not enough to point out that most of the usual safeguards of the 
adversary process attend the statement, when the single safeguard missing is the one 
the Confrontation Clause demands." (emphasis added». 
17 See id. at 51. 
18 See Grimm, supra note 8, at 189 and n.17 ("unavailable" is defmed in FED. R. 
EVID. 804(a) and MD. RULE 5-804(a); a declarant is unavailable in situations in 
which a privilege precludes in-court testimony). 
19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
2° Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum 
to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; 
and to police interrogations. These are the modem practices with closest kinship to 
the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."), 
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[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, 
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; . . . contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; ... statements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later tria1.21 
163 
Statements made to police during the course of an interrogation are 
testimonial under all three definitions, because "[a]n accuser who makes a 
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in.a sense that a 
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.,,22 
Although not an exhaustive list of testimonial statements, the three core 
classes all support the conclusion that a testimonial statement is one in which 
a reasonable declarant would foresee as being available for later use at trial. 
This is the essence of Crawford. 
D. The Primary Purpose Test 
The Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis and expounded on its 
defmition of "testimonial" two years after its decision in Crawford.23 In 
Davis, the Court held that the "primary purpose" ofa 911 call was to respond 
to an "ongoing emergency," and not to acquire evidence for a later 
prosecution?4 Thus the statement was non-testimonial and admissible, as its 
primary purpose was not evidentiary in nature.25 In contrast, the subsequent 
affidavit given to police at the scene of an alleged domestic incident was 
testimonial where there was no ongoing emergency at the time the statement 
. 26 
was gIven. 
Simply put, the relevant distinction between the phone call that reported a 
domestic assault and the subsequent statement to police on-scene was that 
the 911 call concerned "what is happening" (more likely non-testimonial), 
whereas the battery affidavit pertained to "what happened" (more likely 
testimonial).27 
21 Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). 
22Id. at 51-53. 
23 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (overruling Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005». 
24 Washington v. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
2S Id. at 814-15. 
26Id. 
27Id. at 829-30. Maryland courts have also held that a statement on a 911 recording 
was non-testimonial, while a subsequent statement made to police at a hospital 
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E. A Dual Perspective 
The primary purpose test in Davis was somewhat ambiguous because the 
Court suggested, but did not state definitively, "that both the declarant's 
intent and the interrogator's motives [were] relevant considerations.,,28 Any 
such confusion was clarified by the Court in 2011. 
In Michigan v. Bryant, a shooting victim's statement to responding 
officers was deemed non-testimonial in light of an apparent ongoing 
emergency.29 Substantial weight was given to the perception of both the 
declarant and the interrogator.3o The Court explained that the existence of an 
emergency is a fact-dependent inquiry.31 
The level of formality surrounding the statement's making was also 
relevant. Statements made during the course of an ongoing emergency are 
usually "frantic," and are clearly "distinguishable from the formal station-
house interrogation in Crawford. ,,32 
F. The Right to Confrontation in Maryland 
The Maryland decision most akin to this comment's topic is Cox v. 
State.33 The case was decided subsequent to Michigan v. Bryant and 
therefore reflects Maryland's interpretation of the current version of the 
Supreme Court's primary purpose inquiry.34 
The issue in the case was whether a statement made by a co-defendant to 
a fellow inmate while incarcerated was testimonial under Crawford.35 The 
court determined that the statement was non-testimonial and admissible 
because it was a casual remark between mere acquaintances that was not 
made under circumstances objectively indicating that it would be available 
following the alleged incident was testimonial. See Grimm, supra note 8, at 163 
(discussing Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005». 
28 Shari H. Silver, Michigan v. Bryant: Returning to an Open-Ended Confrontation 
Clause Analysis, 71 MD. L. REv. 545,555 (2012). 
29 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147 (2011). 
30/d. at 1160-62. 
31Id. at 1158. 
32 I d. ("[T]he questioning in this case occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to 
the arrival of emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
33421 Md. 630,28 A.3d 687 (2011). 
34 See id. As will be explained, the present state of the primary purpose test is quite 
uncertain, as a four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court recently proposed a 
modification that the other five Justices strongly denounced; therefore, Cox and 
Bryant still constitute good law today. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.iv. 
35 Cox, 421 Md. at 636, 28 A.3d at 690. 
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for later evidentiary use.36 In so holding, the court distinguished statements 
made to government personnel, and statements between private parties.37 
The court found the analysis in United States v. Smalls "particularly 
enlightening.,,38 There, the Tenth Circuit admitted a statement made to an 
inmate who was serving as a governmental informant, solely because the 
declarant was unaware of the informant's status.39 Therefore, objectively 
viewed from the perspective of the declarant, the statement was not for the 
primary purpose of establishing facts for a later prosecution, and was "more 
akin to casual remarks to an acquaintance than formal declarations to an 
official. ,,40 
However, what Cox failed to mention was that Smalls was decided prior 
to Bryant. The Tenth Circuit did not have to consider the perspective of all 
parties involved in the statement's making. Indeed, what was interesting 
about Cox was its application of Bryant.41 Although the court acknowledged 
that Bryant considered the perspective of all parties involved, the court's 
opinion nonetheless turned exclusively on an objective declarant standard.42 
In short, because the declarant's statements were spontaneous and against 
penal interest, between casual acquaintances in a non-formal setting, the 
court held that the statements were not made for the "primary purpose of 
creating a substitute for trial testimony.,,43 
Cox is relevant to jailhouse phone calls because both scenarios involve 
correspondence between private parties in a jailhouse context that is not the 
product of an official interrogation. However, as will be presented infra, 
pointed differences exist between cases like Cox and the phone calls at issue 
herein. 
III. JAILHOUSE PHONE CALLS: THE NEXT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
DILEMMA? 
The principal focus of this article is quite fact specific. Even still, it may 
be analyzed in a variety of ways due to the Sixth Amendment's continued 
evolution. 
36Id. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699. 
37Id. at 642-51, 28 A.3d at 694-99. 
38Id. at 647, 28 A.3d at 697 (citing United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 779-80 
(10th Cir. 2010». 
39Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Cox, 421 Md. at 648-50,28 A.3d at 697-99 (citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143). 
42 Id. (reflecting that Maryland attributes more weight to a declarant's point of view). 
It is arguable, therefore, that a declarant-driven approach is still available to 
Maryland practitioners. 
43 Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 
(1970». 
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Whether jailhouse phone calls made by a non-testifying co-defendant that 
are incriminating against another co-defendant are testimonial under 
Crawford and its progeny may vary on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. 
Although the consensus to date indicates a tendency to view said phone calls 
as non-testimonial, this comment will argue that, if presented with the right 
fact pattern, Maryland should hold differently.44 
In fact, the issue has already reared its head in the trial courts of 
Maryland. The following will introduce a 2012 case out of the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City in which certain jailhouse phone calls were admitted 
under Crawford in a joint criminal trial of Hugh Wade and Donnie Adams. 
A. Jailhouse Phone Calls Before the 2012 Case of Hugh Wade 
i. The Ninth Circuit 
In 2007, a defendant appealed his conviction for robbery on the grounds 
that his right to confrontation was violated when a non-testifying co-
defendant's jailhouse phone call was admitted at a joint criminal tria1.45 In 
Saechao v. Oregon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court's finding that the phone call was non-testimonial, as 
the call was voluntarily between two casual acquaintances without any active 
governmental participation.46 Of particular emphasis was the fact the 
declarant was not attempting to "minimize his own guilt or shift the 
blame.,,47 
ii. The First Circuit 
In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cited 
Saechao and concluded that a non-testifying co-defendant's jailhouse phone 
call was non-testimonial and admissible against another co-defendant.48 
Specifically, in United States v. Castro-Davis, the defendant asserted error in 
the phone call's admission because the co-defendant was "repeatedly 
44 If a co-defendant's jailhouse phone call is deemed testimonial in a joint criminal 
trial, the Supreme Court's decision in Bruton v. United States is implicated. 391 
U.S. 123 (1968). However, Bruton can essentially be disregarded for purposes of 
this paper, as it is only applicable after an out-of-court statement has been deemed 
testimonial. United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]he 
Bruton rule does not apply to non-testimonial hearsay statements.") (internal citation 
omitted). See also supra Part VI.B.vi. 
45 Saechao v. Oregon, 249 Fed.App'x 678,679 (9th Cir. 2007). 
46 Id. (reflecting that the calls were not non-testimonial as a matter of law; rather, the 
court determined that is was merely acceptable, i.e., "not unreasonable," for the 
lower court to label them as such). 
47Id. 
48 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 65. 
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warned" that his conversation was being recorded and had even mentioned 
during the call that he could not say much over the phone.49 The defendant 
argued that the co-defendant's statement was testimonial because a 
reasonable person would perceive the statement's potential for later 
evidentiary use.50 
The First Circuit disagreed and affirmed the defendant's conviction. 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit in Saechao, the court in Castro-Davis 
emphasized the difference between a statement made to a close family 
member, in contrast to a statement made in response to governmental 
questioning. 5 I 
B. Jailhouse Phone Calls in Maryland 
In July of 2011, Hugh Wade was observed by a Baltimore City detective 
engaging in an apparent hand-to-hand drug transaction. 52 Shortly thereafter, 
the vehicle in which Wade was traveling was pulled over.53 When officers 
asked Wade to step out of the vehicle he fled and escaped.54 The driver, co-
defendant Adams, consented to a search of the vehicle, which revealed a 
loaded handgun discovered within a shopping bag. 55 
Eventually, Wade and Adams were both charged with the prohibited 
possession of a firearm. 56 Prior to their joint trial in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, the State moved in limine to admit a recorded phone 
conversation that Adams had made while incarcerated.57 The contents of the 
recording were incriminating as to Wade, and the State moved to have the 
evidence admitted against both defendants on the grounds that the pertinent 
statements were non-testimonial. 58 
49 Id. at 64-65. This is the case with most, ifnot all jailhouse phone calls; when 
inmates make a call from jail, an automated recording states that the call is subject to 
monitoring. See infra note 58. . 
50 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 64-65. 
51 I d. 
52 State's Motion in limine to Admit Defendant's Jail Call Statements at 2, State v. 
Adams et ai., Nos. 11217015 and 211273009 (Feb. 17,2012) [hereinafter "State's 
Motion in Wade"] (explaining that Wade exited a vehicle to conduct the transaction, 
and then left the scene in the same vehicle that he arrived in). 
53 Id. at 3. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56Id. at 1. 
57 See id. 
58 State's Motion in Wade at 1,3,6. A transcript of the phone call indicated that co-
defendant Adams was warned that his statement was being recorded, and also 
revealed that Adams was upset with co-defendant Wade: 
Recording: You have a collect call from "Donnie" an inmate 
at the Baltimore Central Booking, an intake 
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The State argued that the statements were the product of a casual 
conversation between private acquaintances without any direct governmental 
involvement.59 The State acknowledged that the facts of Wade were 
inapposite to the facts of Cox, but nonetheless implored the court to apply 
Cox and conclude that the jailhouse recording was non-testimonial because it 
was an informal statement that was not elicited in response to governmental 
questioning, nor was it a statement in which a reasonable declarant would 
foresee its later availability at tria1.60 
At the motions hearing the trial judge focused the inquiry on the 
substance of Adams' statement, specifically whether Adams was trying to 
negate personal guilt and/or shift blame towards Wade.61 In that regard, the 
State argued that it would be absurd to conclude that Adams intended to shift 
blame towards Wade, in light of the fact that the statement did not expressly 
mention Wade by name, and was in substance, against Adams' own penal 
interest.62 
Ultimately, the circuit court would grant the State's motion.63 The 
reasons for doing so were twofold. First, the trial judge did not believe that 
Adams intended to bear witness against Wade, in part because Adams did 
not explicitly name Wade.64 Alternatively, the court opined that "[e]ven if 
Adams: 
Male: 
Adams: 
Male: 
Adams: 
center. This call is subject to recording and 
monitoring ... 
. . . the whole day I got him hanging with me. So 
you know how [he] is he got that joint in his 
pocket the whole time. And all of a sudden. Yo. 
Whats up now I'm thinking he still got it and he 
ain't got it. Come on now. 
So where did he put it? On his side or 
something? 
No. In the bag with the polos. 
Oh ok, ok, ok. Damn yo. 
Dumb shit. Do you know how mad I was yo. 
Id. at 11. In its motion in limine, the State concluded that Adams was referring to 
Wade and that the ')oint" referred to the recovered firearm. Id. at 3. 
59 Id. at 9. 
60 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 20-21, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009). 
61Id. at 22. 
62Id. at 23-24. 
63 Jd. at 39. 
64 Id. In fact, the trial judge concluded that Adams' statement was not inculpatory 
against Wade. Id. ("It's not inculpatory because it turns out that Wade didn't have 
the handgun on him, Adams had it in his car."). However, this conclusion is plainly 
erroneous and it will not be addressed further in this comment. See United State v. 
Dargan, 738 F.3d 643,649 (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594,603 
(1994)) (statements are "intrinsically inculpatory to the extent they demonstrate 
knowledge of 'significant details about the crime. "'). 
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Adams had intended to or did expect to use the phone call to direct the police 
to Wade, Adams is not exculpated from any of the handgun charges.,,65 
Therefore, the fact that the statement was against Adams' own penal interest 
was dispositive of its non-testimonial character, as applied to Wade's right to 
confrontation.66 
C. 2012 Counterarguments to the Rule in Wade 
The case of Hugh Wade serves as an example of how the issue of 
jailhouse phone calls is presently being handled in the trial courts of 
Maryland. After granting the State's motion the case proceeded as if Adams' 
statement would be offered at trial against Wade. Eventually, a guilty plea 
was entered that effectively waived Wade's right to appeal.67 
The following section will provide valid assertions in opposition to the 
circuit court's grant of the pertinent pretrial motion in Wade. Arguments will 
be presented as to why the motion was incorrectly granted at the time of its 
ruling and under the authority cited therein by the State.68 While general 
arguments will be presented that pertain to "typical" scenarios involving co-
defendants and jailhouse phone calls, it is important to bear in mind that the 
Confrontation Clause is required to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis.69 
i. Cox is inapposite to the facts of Wade 
Cox v. State was the sole case of comparison utilized during the portion of 
the pretrial hearing that dealt with Wade's Sixth Amendment rights.70 The 
trial judge applied the Cox definition of a testimonial statement and 
analogized the facts of Wade with the pertinent facts in Cox.7l Co-defendant 
Adams' statements were likened to those in Cox because both were "more 
akin to casual remarks to acquaintances than formal declarations to an 
official."n Additionally, both statements were self-inculpatory, and "were 
65 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009). 
66 Id 
67 Case Number 211273009, MD. JUDICIARY CASE SEARCH, 
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (follow "Continue" 
hyperlink, then search "Court" for "Baltimore City Circuit Court" and search "Case 
Number" for "211273009," then follow "Get Case" hyperlink). 
68 This comment is not intended to suggest that the trial court was undoubtedly in 
error when it granted the State's motion. The facts of the case surely provide for a 
close call. The following simply provides the arguments that could have been made 
by the defendant, had the case presented itself for appellate review. 
69 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011). 
70 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 37-39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009). 
71Id 
72 !d. at 37. 
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not made for the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial 
testimony." 73 
Again, however, pointed differences exist that would justify 
distinguishing Wade from Cox in order to find the jailhouse phone call of co-
defendant Adams testimonial. The primary difference is the irrefutable fact 
that inmates are aware that their calls from jail are recorded.74 This makes 
the scenario more akin to statements made to State actors, rather than casual 
conversations with private acquaintances. 
Indeed, Cox involved a statement between inmates that was made 
completely unbeknownst to any sort of governmental involvement.75 
Although it is logical to state that a reasonably prudent inmate, speaking in 
private with another inmate, would not expect his or her statement to be later 
available for use at trial, this assumption is borderline nonsensical when 
applied to jailhouse phone calls in which inmates are notified, every time 
they make a call, that it is being monitored.76 
In sum, while there may be other justifications supporting the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City's ruling in Wade, simply applying Cox and resting 
on the alleged similarities of the two fact patterns should not have survived 
appellate scrutiny, if the case would have made it that far. 
ii. Application of the primary purpose test 
Michigan v. Bryant was the controlling case at the time the court granted 
the State's motion in Wade. 77 The post-Bryant primary purpose test has been 
interpreted as defining a testimonial statement as one that is made with the 
primary purpose of providing evidence.78 A straight-forward application of 
this standard suggests that Co-Defendant Adams' statements were 
testimonial in nature. 
The main reason for this conclusion is again an inmate's knowledge that 
jailhouse phone calls are monitored. Inmates often talk cryptically and 
occasionally acknowledge, as did the declarant in Castro-Davis, the need to 
73Id. 
74 See supra note 49,58. 
75 Cox, 421 Md. At 647, 28 A.3d at 697 (citing United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 
765, 779-80 (10th Cir. 2010». 
76 See supra note 49, 58. 
77 See supra Part ILE. 
78 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2273-74 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
("We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose 
of establishing 'past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution' - in 
other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.") (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[F]or a 
statement to be testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the 
declarant must primarily intend to establish some fact with the understanding that his 
statement may be used in a criminal prosecution."). 
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be careful of what is said on the recording.79 Therefore, when an inmate 
provides information regarding criminal activity despite such knowledge, it 
follows that the statement's primary purpose is evidentiary in nature. 
One could also argue that the government's primary purpose in recording 
jailhouse phone calls is investigatory in nature, on the grounds that 
correctional facilities routinely monitor inmates' phone calls in an attempt to 
assist in the prosecution of same.80 However, in Cox, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland applied a declarant-driven approach without much consideration 
of the point of view of the State; thus the scope of Bryant's dual perspective 
in Maryland is presently unclear.81 
Timing was also an important factor in Bryant.82 A statement describing 
events as they are actually occurring is more likely to be non-testimonial, 
whereas a statement describing past events is more likely to be for the 
primary purpose of providing evidence.83 Given the custodial nature of a 
jailhouse, many of the relevant phone calls will pertain to past events, as was 
the case in Wade. 84 
iii. Due to co-defendant Adams' acrimonious tone, too much emphasis 
was placed on the statement's self-inculpatory nature 
It may be argued that it was error for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
to conclude that Adams' statement was non-testimonial because it was 
against his penal interest.85 This is because, viewed as a whole, the relevant 
recording demonstrates ill will on behalf of Adams in regard to Wade.86 As 
such, Wade is distinguishable from Cox, Saechao, and Castro-Davis, as co-
defendant Adams' statement can be viewed as a clear attempt to shift blame 
and negate guilt. 87 
In Saechao, the declarant stated, "too bad I happen to have been with him 
that night.,,88 This was not an attempt to shift blame and was against the 
declarant's penal interest. 89 Relatedly, the declarant in Cox did not 
79 See Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 64-65. 
80 But see infra note 177. 
81 See Cox, 421 Md. at 647, 28 A.3d at 697. 
82 See supra note 28. 
83 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30. 
84 See supra note 58. Theoretically, an exception to this general notion could 
involve cases where inmates are conducting illegal operations over the phone while 
incarcerated, such as selling drugs. 
85 Transcript of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2010) (No. 211273009). 
86 See supra note 58. 
87 See supra Parts II.F, III.A. 
88 Saechao v. Oregon, 249 F.App'x 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2007). 
89 See id. 
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demonstrate any animus towards the respective defendant, who was actually 
party to the pertinent jailhouse conversation.90 
Clearly, this differs from Wade, where co-defendant Adams made the 
pertinent phone call outside of Wade's presence while well aware that his 
statement was being recorded.91 Moreover, Adams' statement was a clear 
attempt to shift blame, as he essentially claimed that the recovered ftrearm 
was Wade's exclusively, and that he only consented to a search because he 
was under the impression that the weapon was in Wade's possession and no 
longer in the vehicle.92 
The State avoided Adams' apparent animus in its motion in limine by 
focusing on the fact that the statement reflected Adams' own "consciousness 
of guilt.,,93 This supported a non-testimonial ftnding because a reasonable 
declarant would not typically make a statement against their own penal 
interest where there is the potential for its later use at tria1.94 
However, considering Adams' situation in its entirety yields a conclusion 
contrary to the position advocated by the State and eventually accepted by 
the court.95 The facts underlying Adams' position at the time of his phone 
call were not in his favor, as a handgun was discovered in his possession at 
the time of his arrest.96 Thus he was unlikely to escape prosecution 
unscathed, whereas at that point Wade had not even been charged after 
having fled and escaped.97 
It can be argued that this reality was reflected in Adams' negative tone. 
Although the court relied on the fact that the recording was, in part, self-
inculpatory, that does not change the overall and plain language 
interpretation of the statement: Adams was rather upset because a ftrearm 
that allegedly belonged to Wade was discovered in the vehicle that Adams 
was driving. 98 
90 Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699. 
91 See supra note 58. 
92Id. (reflecting that Adams' stated: "[w]hats up now I'm thinking he still got it and 
he ain't got it"); State's Motion in Wade at 3; Transcripts of Motions Hearing at 37-
39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009). 
93 State's Motion in Wade at 2. 
94 See id. at 7. 
95 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66 ("[E]ven if the assessment ofthe officer's ['neutral'] 
motives was accurate, it says nothing about Sylvia'S perception of her situation. 
Only cross-examination could reveal that.") (emphasis added). 
96 State's Motion in Wade at l. 
97 Id. In other words, it is arguable that Adams intended to "shift blame" because he 
was of the mindset that he had nothing to lose by making a statement against his own 
penal interest, while simultaneously extracting some vengeance against Wade. See 
supra Part lILA. 
98 See supra note 58. 
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More simply put, the inculpatory nature of the statement, while 
potentially relevant to a Crawford analysis, was given far too much weight in 
light of the actual circumstances present at the time.99 
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN THE CONTEXT OF FORENSIC REpORTS 
The remainder of this comment will discuss the state of confrontation in 
Maryland and at the federal level subsequent to the case of Hugh Wade. 
Though the foregoing section analyzed Wade from a 2012 point of view, this 
article will conclude with 2014 recommendations, while also discussing how 
a court could address a case like Wade today. To do so, a recent hot topic in 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence must be discussed - forensic reports. 100 
In the 2009 case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court 
addressed the admissibility of a "certificate of analysis" that outlined a lab 
report's conclusions and certified the report's accuracy and authenticity.lol 
The certificate was offered at trial in lieu of the live testimony of the analyst 
who conducted the testing, in order to show that the substance allegedly 
possessed by the defendant was cocaine. 102 The Court held that the lab 
report's conclusions were inadmissible absent the in-court testimony of the 
analyst who compiled the report. 103 The Court viewed the certificate as an 
affidavit, "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely 
what a witness does on direct examination. ",104 
In 2011, the principles of Melendez-Diaz were affirmed in Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico. 105 There, the lab report at issue pertained to a defendant's 
blood alcohol content. The State did not call the author of the signed report 
to testify, but rather had a "surrogate" witness take the stand and recite the 
report's fmdings. 106 The Court held, as it did in Melendez-Diaz, that the 
report was testimonial because its primary purpose was clearly 
evidentiary. 107 
99 See supra notes 65-66. 
100 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
101 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308. 
102 !d. 
103 !d. at 310-11. 
104 Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830). 
105 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2707. 
106 Id. at 2715. 
107Id. at 2717 ("In all material respects, the laboratory reports in this case resembles 
those in Melendez-Diaz."). 
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A. The Supreme Court's Latest Interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
The Supreme Court's latest substantive interpretation of the right to 
confrontation came in June 2012. 108 Once again, the Court was faced with 
assessing the constitutionality of introducing forensic reports via surrogate 
testimony. 109 
The specific issue in Williams v. Illinois was whether a defendant's right 
to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted "basis testimony" 
by a police forensics expert. 110 Basis testimony is a type of surrogate 
testimony in which an expert forms an opinion that is "based" on some 
external data, even if the underlying data is inadmissible in and of itself. III 
The police expert testified during a bench trial that the defendant's DNA 
matched a sample taken from a rape victim and analyzed at an outside 
laboratory.112 The defendant argued that it constituted testimonial hearsay 
for the expert to base her 0ginion on the conclusions of a report in which she 
took no part in compiling. 1 3 
A bitterly divided Court affirmed the Illinois state courts' finding that the 
Sixth Amendment was not violated by the admission of the expert's 
testimony.114 Justice Thomas, whose opinion helped create the very narrow 
holding that the pertinent statement was non-testimonial, concurred in 
judgment only, on grounds wholly incongruent with that of the plurality.1I5 
As such, Williams serves as a prime example of the oscillatory nature of 
today's Confrontation Clause. 
The plurality sided with the state courts on two alternative grounds: (1) 
the Confrontation Clause was not implicated because the expert's basis was 
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted;1l6 (2) and even if the 
108 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
109 See supra note 100. 
110 Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221. 
III Id. at 2233-35 (plurality opinion). This presents an issue because the expert 
lacked personal knowledge of the opinion's underlying "basis," and thus a criminal 
defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant as to the validity of the basis of 
the expert opinion. !d. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 2222-23 (plurality opinion). 
113 Id. at 2223 (plurality opinion). 
114Id. 
115 See id. at 2255-56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality that the 
lab report was non-testimonial, but also sharing the "dissent's view of the plurality's 
flawed analysis"); see also id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the 
plurality opinion as, in essence, a dissent because "[f]ive Justices specifically reject 
every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its explication"). 
116 Id. at 2240. The Confrontation Clause applies solely to out-of-court statements 
that qualify as hearsay. See supra note 7. Under state evidentiary law, basis 
testimony is not admissible for its truth; the Williams plurality was influenced by this 
and the fact the case involved a bench trial, asserting that judges are presumed to 
understand such subtleties in the rules of evidence. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2234-35 
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report was offered for its truth, the Confrontation Clause was not violated 
because the underlying basis, i.e., the DNA report, was non-testimonia1. 117 
i. A very narrow holding 
The holding of Williams is limited because the plurality's "not-for-its-
truth" rationale was rejected by a majority of the COurt;IIS thus the holding is 
simply that the Confrontation Clause was not violated because the 
underlying DNA analysis was non-testimonia1."9 This was the shared view 
of the plurality and Justice Thomas. 120 Though reached on completely 
different grounds, the end result was a five-Justice majority holding that the 
Sixth Amendment was not offended by the State's use of surrogate 
testimony. 121 
At first glance, the outcome seems to contradict Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, where certain forensic reports were deemed testimonia1. 122 
However, both the plurality and Justice Thomas distinguished Williams from 
past case law, concluding that the differing outcomes were entirely consistent 
with one another. 123 The dissent vehemently disagreed. 124 
(plurality opinion). However, this conclusion was hotly contested by Justice 
Thomas's concurrence and the four Justices in dissent, i.e., a majority of the Court. 
The plurality was accused of inappropriately allowing evidentiary rules to trump 
constitutional rights. Id. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[W]e have recognized 
that concepts central to the application of the Confrontation Clause are ultimately 
matters of federal constitutional law that are not dictated by state or federal 
evidentiary rules."); id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e do not typically allow 
state law to define federal constitutional requirements."). 
117 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion). 
liS See supra note 116. 
119 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2226 (plurality opinion). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. at 2244. When construing the decision based on a five justice majority, 
regardless of specific rationale, the outcome in Williams is twofold: (1) the expert's 
testimony triggered consideration of the Sixth Amendment regardless of applicable 
evidentiary rules as its underlying "basis" was offered for its truth and equated to 
hearsay (per Justice Thomas's concurrence and the four dissenting Justices); (2) 
though implicated, the defendant's right to confrontation was not violated as the 
underlying DNA report was non-testimonial (per Justice Thomas's concurrence and 
the four-Justice plurality). 
122 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11; Bul/coming, 131 S. Ct. At 2707. 
123 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2240 (plurality opinion); id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
124 See infra note 140. 
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ii. The plurality's rationale for finding the lab report non-testimonial 
What is most noteworthy in Williams is the plurality's modification of the 
primary purpose test, in which a novel ingredient was added to the analysis, a 
factor that, when absent, was alleged to be dispositive of a statement's non-
testimonial character. 125 However, as was the case with the plurality's "not-
for-its-truth" conclusion, five Justices of the Court expressly rejected the 
proposed alteration to what heretofore had been the primary purpose test of 
Michigan v. Bryant. 126 
In order to distinguish Williams from Bul/coming and Melendez-Diaz, the 
plurality summarized the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause as applying to 
formalized statements that have the "primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual of engaging in criminal conduct.,,127 The plurality reasoned that 
the forensic reports in Bul/coming and Melendez-Diaz had a primary purpose 
of targeting a specific individual, whereas the lab report in Williams was 
compiled long before the defendant was identified as a suspect. 128 
Williams serves as the first instance in which the Court explicitly 
mentioned a "particular individual" aspect of the primary purpose test. 129 
For this reason, among others, five Justices rejected the proposed 
modification, which has been dubbed the "accusation" test. 130 
iii. The concurrence's rationale for finding the lab report non-
testimonial. 
Justice Thomas has established himself as a recluse in his Sixth 
Amendment analysis. 131 He has filed concurring opinions in many of the 
125 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (plurality opinion). 
126 See infra note 129; see also supra note 34. 
127 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
128 Id. at 2243 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted); but see id. at 2262 
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he text of the Confrontation Clause does not constrain 
the time at which one becomes a 'witness' .... Historical practice confirms that a 
declarant could become a 'witness' before the accused's identity was known."). 
129 See id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[The plurality's] test lacks any 
grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic .. "); id. at 2274 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) ("None of our other cases have suggested that, in addition, the statement 
must be meant to accuse a previously identified individual; indeed, in Melendez-
Diaz, we rejected a related argument that laboratory 'analysts are not subject to 
confrontation because they are not 'accusatory' witnesses. "') (internal citations 
omitted). 
130 See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.iv (further discussing the problems with the 
"accusation" test). 
131 See, e.g., Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 142, 73 A.3d 254, 286 (2013) (Eldridge, J., 
dissenting) ("The opening paragraph of Justice Thomas's Williams· opinion also 
referred to his previous concurring opinion in Michigan v. Bryant, also an opinion 
which no other Justice joined.") (internal citation omitted). 
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landmark decisions that have come in Crawford's wake, oftentimes agreeing 
with a case's outcome, but on grounds that are not shared by any of his 
brethren. 132 
According to Justice Thomas, "the Confrontation Clause reaches 
'formalized testimonial materials,' such as depositions, affidavits, and prior 
testimony, or statements resulting from 'formalized dialogue,' such as 
custodial interrogation.,,133 Under that standard, the DNA report in Williams 
was viewed as non-testimonial because it was not prepared by a "witness" in 
the historical sense, as it lacked the requisite "formality and solemnity 
necessary to come within the scope of the Clause.,,134 
Justice Thomas distinguished the reports in Melendez-Diaz (which were 
sworn before a notary), and Bullcoming (which included a "certificate of 
analysis"), from the lab report in Williams that was "neither a sworn nor 
certified declaration of fact.,,135 Expressed differently, the certifications in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were considered to be, in essence, affidavits, 
whereas the DNA report in Williams, "in substance, certifie[d] nothing.,,136 
This distinction, i.e., whether a lab report formally certifies its authenticity, 
somewhat akin to the taking of an oath, was of constitutional significance 
because such certifications "are functionally identical to live, in-court 
testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct eXaInination.,,137 
iv. The four Justices in dissent found the lab report testimonial in 
nature 
Justice Kagan was joined in dissent by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, 
and Justice Sotomayor.138 In their view, the expert's testimony should have 
been withheld as testimonial hearsay because the case was functionally 
indistinguishable from Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz. 139 Further, the 
132/d. 
133 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Michigan v. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring))(emphasis added); 
see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836-37 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
134 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2261-62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). "Solemnity" is consistent with the historical principles behind the Sixth 
Amendment because it reflects "the practices that the Confrontation Clause was 
designed to eliminate," i.e., "the ex parte examination of witnesses" or its functional 
eauiva1ent. Id. 
13 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
136 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
137 Id. at 2260-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
138/d. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
139/d. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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dissent acknowledged the fragmented nature of the Court's disposition and 
suggested that past precedent still controls. 140 
B. The Aftermath o/Williams v. Illinois 
Because the Supreme Court agreed on very little in Williams, the scope of 
today's right to confrontation is very much unsettled. 141 Of course, certain 
basic conclusions can be stated with certainty,142 but generally, Craw/ordhas 
failed to instill the consistency it sought. 143 Thus far, courts have seemed to 
follow the advice of Justice Kagan by continuing to treat Williams' 
predecessors as controlling. 144 
i. Williams' reverberations in Maryland 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's 2011 decision in Derr v. State 
("Derr 1') appeared entirely consistent with Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming. 145 Following the Supreme Court's 2012 opinion in Williams, 
however, Derr I was reversed and remanded for further consideration.146 
The facts of the case are strikingly similar to the facts of Williams. In 
Derr 1, the State called a forensic DNA examiner from the FBI to provide 
expert testimony during a 2006 trial in which Norman Derr was charged with 
first-degree rape. 147 Over Derr's objection, the expert opined that the DNA 
recovered from a 1984 rape victim matched the DNA recovered from the 
defendant in 2004.148 
In 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court and 
ordered a new trial after concluding that the Sixth Amendment was violated 
by the admission of the expert's testimony.149 However, in 2013, when 
Derr's conviction on retrial was appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, Derr v. State ("Derr If') shifted course following remand and 
140 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("I would decide this case 
consistently with, and for the reasons stated by, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 
And until a majority of this Court reverses or confines those decisions, 1 would 
understand them as continuing to govern, in every particular, the admission of 
forensic evidence." (internal citations omitted». 
141 See supra note 11. 
142 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
143 See generally id. at 60-68. 
144 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 229 W. Va. 756, 770 (2012) ("[W]e construe 
Williams with extreme caution and admonish lower courts to do likewise."). 145 422 Md. 211, 29 A.3d 533 (2011) (judgment vacated by Maryland v. Derr, 133 S. 
Ct. 63 (2012». 
146 See Maryland v. Derr, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012). 
147 Derr, 422 Md. at 219-20,29 A.3d at 539. 
148 [d. 
149 [d. at 253, 29 A.3d at 559. 
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affirmed the defendant's conviction, fmding the DNA report not "sufficiently 
formalized. ,,150 
ii. The Marks test 
Given the fragmented nature of the Supreme Court's decision, the court in 
Derr II was tasked with interpreting the holding of Williams. lsl This 
required applying the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Marks v. 
United States: 
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest groundS. IS2 
The court read Williams to require "that statements be, at a minimum, 
formalized to be testimonial."ls3 To arrive at this conclusion, the Derr II 
majority considered "[t]he common point of agreement between the plurality 
opinion and Justice Thomas's concurring opinion."ls4 
Although the Williams "plurality did not clarify how to determine if a 
statement is sufficiently formalized," it referenced "nearly the same 
examples" as Justice Thomas. 155 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland adopted Justice Thomas's definition of"formalized.,,156 
Judge Greene's' majority opinion was joined by three other judges.157 
Judge McDonald concurred in judgment only, and Judge Eldridge was joined 
by Chief Judge Bell in dissent. 1S8 Judge McDonald's concurrence agreed 
150 See Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 105, 73 A.3d 254,264 (2013) (hereinafter "Derr 
IF') ("Applying the narrowest holding of the plurality opinion and Justice Thomas's 
concurring opinion in Williams we further conclude that the information relied upon 
and presented as the basis for [the expert's] in-court testimony is not testimonial."). 
151 Derr II completely disregarded the Williams "accusation" test. See id 434 Md. at 
115, 73 A.3d at 270, n.15 ("[The Williams] plurality's assertion that forensic 
evidence must be prepared for the 'primary purpose' of accusing a targeted 
individual was expressly rejected by both Justice Thomas's concurring opinion and 
the dissenting opinion. Because the plurality opinion's 'primary purpose' test has the 
support of only four Justices it is not an aspect of the narrowest grounds leading to 
the judgment of the Court." (internal citation omitted)). 
152/d. at 114, 73 A.3d at 269 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977)). 
153 Derr 11,434 Md. at 114, 76 A.3d at 270 (emphasis added). 
154/d. at 115, 73 A.3d at 270. 
155/d. at 116,73 A.3d at 271 (internal citation omitted). 
156 Id. 
157Id. at 88, 73 A.3d at 254. 
158 Id 
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that application of Williams to the facts of Derr II required concluding that 
the DNA report was non-testimonial, but questioned the validity of the 
majority's application of the Marks standard.159 Judge Eldridge's dissent 
also criticized the majority's application of Marks .160 The dissent likened the 
majority's opinion to Grutter v. Bollinger, where "the Supreme Court 
seemed particularly concerned about applying the Marks test to conclude that 
a portion of the opinion of one Justice, not joined by any other Justice, 
represented the Court's holding.,,161 Because Justice Thomas's opinion was 
not joined by any of his brethren in Williams, the Court's qualms in Grutter 
were realized in Derr II. 
iii. Derr II is limited to forensic reports 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Cooper v. State four days 
after announcing its opinion in Derr 11. 162 The court again addressed the 
admissibility of expert basis testimony in the context of DNA analysis, 
finding a forensic report non-testimonial under Williams, as interpreted by 
Derr 11. 163 However, whereas Derr II was unclear as to its scope, Cooper 
limited its reach to forensic reports. l64 Outside of that narrow context, 
therefore, an inquiry into a statement's testimonial character in Maryland 
includes more than simply considering whether Justice Thomas would find 
sufficient "solemnity.,,165 
159 Derr II, 434 Md. at 139-40, 73 A.3d at 284 (McDonald, 1., concurring) (noting 
that rather than construing the narrowest holding in Williams, the majority in Derr II 
"latched upon the narrowest definition of 'testimonial hearsay"'). 
160 Rather than trying to discern similarities between the Williams plurality and 
Justice Thomas, the dissent would have simply affirmed Derr I "as a matter of 
Maryland law." Id. at 140-41,73 A.3d at 285 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause 
there was no opinion by the Court in Williams, and probably no holding shared by 
the Williams plurality and Justice Thomas, I would no longer attempt to reach the 
Sixth Amendment issue in this case." (internal citation omitted». 
161Id. at 140-42, 73 A.3d at 286 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003» ("If Justice Thomas's opinion in Williams did 
represent the holding of the Court, it is difficult to understand why no member of the 
plurality joined the Thomas opinion, or why Justice Thomas did not join a portion of 
the plurality opinion."). 162 434 Md. 209, 73 A.3d 1108 (2013). 
163 I d. at 233, 73 A.3d at 1122. 
164 /d. at 234, 73 A.3d at 1122-23 ("In Derr II, we were able to discern ... an 
applicable standard for determining whether forensic test results are testimonial." 
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added». 
165 See supra notes 34, 135. 
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IV. The Fifth Circuit shares the views of the five Justices of the 
Supreme Court who rejected the "accusation" test 
In December 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit strongly rebuked the Williams plurality's "accusation" test, while also 
succinctly describing the views of the "majority" of the Court, embodied in 
the opinions of Justice Kagan and Justice Thomas. !66 
In United States v. Duron-Caldera, the Fifth Circuit held that an 
immigration affidavit was testimonial even though it was compiled in 1968 
by the defendant's grandmother for purposes of an immigration 
proceeding.!67 The government sought to admit the affidavit in a 2011 
criminal trial to prove the defendant's alienage.!68 The government urged the 
court to apply the "accusation" test to find the affidavit non-testimonial, on 
the grounds that the declarant-grandmother did not intend to bear witness 
against the defendant-grandson at the time the statement was made.!69 
The court refused to adopt the '''accusation' test for a number of 
reasons.,,!70 Among them, the test relied on an "overly-narrow view" of the 
right to confrontation and was expressly rejected by a five Justice majority of 
the Court.!7! Instead, the Fifth Circuit described a testimonial statement in 
accordance with Supreme Court precedent, as one that is "made for the 
primary purpose of establishing 'past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution. ",172 
To that end, the government argued that the affidavit was non-testimonial 
because it was prepared for an immigration proceeding, and not for a 
criminal trial. 173 The court, however, was not persuaded because the 1968 
"affidavit was taken as part of a document fraud investigation," in which the 
declarant negated personal guilt and shifted blame elsewhere.!74 Given the 
substance of such a statement, the court held that a reasonable person would 
view the affidavit as "potentially relevant" to a later criminal proceeding, 
even if originally created for a non-criminal matter.!75 
166 United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal 
citations omitted). 
167 !d. at 993. 
168 I d. at 991. 
169Id. at 994 (noting that "it was not made to 'accuse'" the particular defendant of a 
crime). 
170 I d. 
171Id. at 994-95. 
172 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 995 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; citing 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714, n.6; citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1155-57; citing 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11; citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 51-52). See also 
sUfra note 78. 
17 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993. 
174 Id. at 994. 
175Id. at 994-96. 
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The Fifth Circuit also explained why the "accusation" test is inconsistent 
with the Constitution's text: 
The Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant ("the 
accused") with the right "to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." The textual juxtaposition, therefore, is not 
between "the accused" and his "accuser"; it is between "the 
accused" and "the witnesses against him." To the extent [the 
defendant] was a witness (discussed earlier), she "certainly 
provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact 
necessary for his conviction" - his alienage. "The text of the 
[Sixth] Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses -
those against the defendant and those in his favor. . . . 
[T]here is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the 
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.,,176 
In other words, if the Fifth Circuit would have found the affidavit non-
testimonial on the basis that the declarant did not intend to bear witness 
against the defendant, the declarant-grandmother would have equated to a 
"third category witness," useful to the prosecution because the statement was 
inculpatory against the defendant-grandson, yet "immune from 
confrontation" because the defendant would be precluded from cross-
examination. 177 
V. 2013 CASE LAW OUT OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT RELEVANT TO JAILHOUSE 
PHONE CALLS 
A. Jailhouse Phone Calls in the Wake of Hugh Wade's Case 
There have been a few decisions in the wake of Hugh Wade's 2012 guilty 
plea that have dealt with Crawford, but only one has dealt with the precise 
issue as presented in Wade. Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the testimonial character of a non-testifying 
co-defenClant's jailhouse phone call in May 2013.178 
In United States v. Jones, the Fourth Circuit found statements on certain 
jailhouse phone calls non-testimonial. 179 The facts of the case involved an 
176 !d. at 995 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313-14) (internal citations omitted) 
(determing that the "accusation" test was essentially rejected by a majority of the 
Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz, when the Court refused to hold that forensic 
analysts were "not subject to confrontation because they are not 'accusatory' 
witnesses, in that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing," again 
because it would create a "third category witness"). 
177 Id.; see also Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
178 United States v. Jones, 716 F.3d 851, 855-56 (4th Cir. 2013). 
179Id. at 853. 
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alleged conspiracy to arrange fraudulent marriages between Navy sailors and 
foreign nationals. 180 At trial in federal district court, three jailhouse phone 
calls were admitted against Jones, contributing to his eventual fifty-two 
month prison sentence.181 Jones argued on appeal that his right to 
confrontation was violated by the admission of certain portions of the 
recordings. 182 
One of the relevant phone calls was a three-way call between Jones, a co-
conspirator ("Otis"), and Jones' uncle ("Austin,,).183 Although Jones did not 
challenge the admission of his personal statements on the recording in light 
of the party opponent exception to the prohibition against hearsay, he 
asserted that the statements of Otis and Austin were testimonial and 
inadmissible. 184 
The court disagreed and affirmed the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, finding the statements of both Otis and Austin 
non-testimonial because the requisite intent to "bear witness" was lacking. 185 
According to the Fourth Circuit: 
[S]tatements are testimonial when a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would have expected his statements to 
be used at trial - that is, whether the declarant would have 
expected or intended to "bear witness" against another in a 
later proceeding. 186 
The court also rejected the argument that an inmate's knowledge is 
dispositive of testimonial intent.187 Specifically, Jones argued that because 
inmates are informed that their calls are recorded, a reasonable person in 
such a position would understand the potential for its later use at trial.188 In 
response, the court explained that it was not the declarant's knowledge that 
was dispositive, but rather the declarant's intent. 189 Describing the call as a 
"casual conversation," the court found it clear that neither Otis nor Austin 
intended to bear witness against Jones, "primarily" because the calls 
180Id. 
181 I d. at 855. 
182 I d. 
183 I d. 
184 Jones, 716 F.3d at 855-56 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)). 
185 !d. at 856. 
186 I d. (quoting United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260,268 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
187 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
188 I d. 
189 I d. ("Even if Otis and Austin were aware that the prison was recording their 
conversation, a declarant's understanding that a statement could potentially serve as 
criminal evidence does not necessarily denote 'testimonial' intent." (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted)). 
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"concerned Otis' emotional state and the prison conditions," and were also 
self-inculpatory in nature.190 
Additionally, although not explicit in the court's opinion, the decision 
appeared to account for Michigan v. Bryant because the Fourth Circuit 
considered the prison's role in creating the recordings. 191 The court opined 
that there are "significant institutional reason[s]" for recording jailhouse 
phone calls, such as "policing its own facility by monitoring prisoners' 
contact with individuals outside the prison.,,192 
Even though the statements of Otis and Austin were non-testimonial, the 
court made clear that the Confrontation Clause is to be applied on a case-by-
case basis. 193 Therefore, Jones could be interpreted as leaving open the 
possibility that certain jailhouse phone calls equate to testimonial statements, 
provided their declarants bear the requisite intent. 
B. The Unanswered Question in Jones: How Much Weight is Due to a 
Statement Against Penal Interest? 
One question that remained unanswered in Jones, just as it did in Saechao 
and Castro-Davis, was the precise weight due to the self-inculpatory nature 
of a co-defendant's statement in situations where there is an obvious intent to 
bear witness by either shifting blame or negating personal guilt.194 The case 
of Hugh Wade would have provided the necessary fact pattern for an 
appellate court to address such an issue, had it not ended in a guilty plea. 195 
It is generally accepted that the self-inculpatory nature of a given 
statement is at least partially relevant under Crawford, the rationale being 
that a reasonable person does not make a self-incriminating statement when 
under the impression that it would be available for later evidentiary use. 196 
The courts in Jones, Saechao, and Castro-Davis all relied on such a factor in 
support of their non-testimonial holdings. 197 However, all three decisions 
were also influenced by the fact that none of the respective declarants 
reflected an accusatory intention. 198 Thus, it is unclear whether the courts 
190Id. 
191 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,1160-62 (2011). 
192 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. This effectively satisfies the primary purpose test of 
Bryant from the perspective of the State, because the act of recording jailhouse 
phone calls is allegedly for a primary purpose other than acquiring evidence for use 
at trial; but see supra notes 34, 42. 
193 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
194 See supra Part III.A, Part V.A. 
195 See supra note 67; see generally supra Part III.B-C. 
196 Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 268. 
197 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856; Castro-Davis, 612 F. 3d at 65; Saechao, 249 Fed. App'x 
at 679. 
198 See generally Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993-96. 
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would have viewed a statement against penal interest as dispositive, had 
there been such an intent. 
Although the Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined that co-
defendant Adams did not intend to bear witness against Hugh Wade, the trial 
judge alternatively concluded that even had such an intent been present, the 
statement was still non-testimonial because of its self-inculpatory nature. 199 
Therefore, the circuit court's decision appears to have given more weight to a 
statement against penal interest than to an intent to bear witness?OO 
C. The Unanswered Question in Jones has Recently Been Answered 
In December 2013, the Fourth Circuit announced its decision in United 
States v. Dargan.201 The case involved a co-conspirator's statement to his 
cellmate while the two were incarcerated.202 The statement was offered at 
trial against the defendant ("Dargan"), who was not present at the time the 
statement was made.203 Following his conspiracy conviction in the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland, Dargan posited two 
separate but related theories on appeal regarding the admissibility of the 
jailhouse statement.204 
First, Dargan proffered that it was improper for the trial judge to utilize 
the hearsay exception found in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) to admit 
the co-conspirator's statement as a statement against penal interest.205 Next, 
Dargan argued that the admission of the out-of-court statement deprived him 
of his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.206 Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit was charged with separately addressing the statement's admissibility 
on constitutional grounds, as well as under the rules of evidence?07 
What is most noteworthy about the opinion is that the self-inculpatory 
nature of the co-conspirator's statement was not included in the court's 
discussion of Crawjord.208 The court first thoroughly considered the 
statement as a hearsay exception; the various factors that must be 
established, typically geared to ensure reliability, were described before the 
court concluded that the co-conspirator's statement constituted a statement 
against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3).209 
199 Transcripts of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 2112730009). 
200 See id. 
201 United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2013). 
202 Id. at 646. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 649. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649; see also supra Part II.A. 
208 Dargan, 738 F.3d at at 650-51. 
209Id. at 650. 
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After affirming the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland's application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fourth Circuit 
addressed the defendant's Confrontation Clause argument.2IO Consistent 
with decisions such as Cox and Smal/s,2Il the court "noted, as a general 
matter that 'statements from one prisoner to another' are 'clearly non-
testimonial. ",212 More specifically, the statement was described as a 
"jailhouse disclosure to a casual acquaintance," made in an "informal 
setting" with "no plausible expectation of 'bearing witness' against 
anyone.,,213 
Despite the thorough explanation as to why the statement constituted a 
statement against interest for purposes of an exception to the rule against 
hearsay, the fact that the pertinent statement was self-incriminating was not 
even referenced in the court's Sixth Amendment analysis.214 This suggests 
that the Fourth Circuit views a statement's self-inculpatory character as 
negligible, if not completely irrelevant under Crawford. 
This is also consistent with Jones.215 Only after thoroughly discussing its 
reliance on the declarant's lack of an intent to bear witness did the court 
mention in one sentence that the statement was also against the declarant's 
penal interest.216 While this may suggest that such a factor is at least 
partially relevant, it is clear that under the views of the Fourth Circuit, it 
would constitute error for a court to view a statement's self-inculpatory 
character as dispositive, as was done in the case of Hugh Wade.217 
D. Additional Conclusions That Can Be Drawn From the Fourth Circuit 
If and when the Court of Appeals of Maryland is faced with an issue in 
line with Hugh Wade's case, the court would have the option of considering 
the recent views of its federal circuit court. Because the Fourth Circuit is 
only persuasive authority and not binding on state courts, Maryland could 
adopt portions of the standard and reject others, pursuant to other relevant 
case law.218 
The following are conclusions that may be drawn from the Fourth Circuit, 
in addition to the above stated reading of Dargan; however, as will be 
210 Id. 
211 See supra note 38. 
212 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 650-51 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 825). 
213 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651 (citing Jones, 716 F.3d at 856). 
214 See Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651. 
215 See supra Part V.A. 
216 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
217 Id.; see also supra Part I1I.B. 
218 Davis v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 29 Md. App. 705, 713, 351 A.2d 905, 910 
(1976) (citing Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975». 
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demonstrated in Part VI of this article, the majority of said conclusions will 
not be recommended for adoption in Maryland.219 
i. Knowledge is not dispositive of testimonial intent, but lack of 
knowledge is dispositive of non-testimonial intent 
A threshold question in Jones dealt with a declarant's knowledge.220 The 
court held that the presence of knowledge does not make a statement 
testimonial per se.221 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument 
that an inmate's "knowledge that he is being recorded is dispositive.,,222 
Rather, such knowledge is a mere factor - and as reflected by the outcome in 
Jones - a factor that can be overcome.223 
Knowledge was also not dispositive in Washington v. Davis and Michigan 
v. Bryant. 224 In fact, knowledge was a non-issue.225 Obviously, a reasonably 
prudent person who calls 911, or who makes a comment directly to an 
investigating officer, is expected to perceive the blatant governmental 
involvement in that particular situation. Thus the declarant's knowledge was 
not in controversy; it was a non-issue. 
Relevant to jailhouse phone calls is the fact that knowledge is present in 
cases like Davis and Bryant, in regard to a declarant's awareness of the 
"governmental presence" at the time of a statement's making.226 In neither 
case was such knowledge dispositive. Therefore, it is possible that Jones, 
Saechao, and Castro-Davis were correct in refusing to view the jailhouse 
notification of recording as conclusive ofa declarant's testimonial intent.227 
Alternatively, Dargan suggests that a statement is non-testimonial per se 
in the absence of knowledge, when a declarant is completely unaware of the 
State's involvement in a statement's making.228 That is, when a person 
makes an assertion to whom he or she believes to be a private acquaintance 
without any governmental affiliation, that statement is non-testimonial as a 
matter of law, even if the other person is in actuality a confidential informant 
acting under orders to obtain information in furtherance of a future 
219 The exception being the amount of weight due to a statement against penal 
interest; as will be discussed, it is the suggestion of this comment that Maryland 
should find the rationale of Dargan "particularly enlightening," in regard to an out-
of-court statement's self-inculpatory character. See infra Part VI.B.ii. 
220 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
221Id. 
222 Id. 
223 I d. 
224 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
225 See id. 
226 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 65; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
227 See Jones, 716 F.3d at 856; Saechao, 249 Fed. App'x 679; Castro-Davis, 612 
F.3d at 65. 
228 See Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651. 
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prosecution. This conclusion is also congruent with the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's opinion in COX.229 
ii. The predominate inquiry focuses on an intent to bear witness, which 
is analogous to the "accusation" test 
United States v. Jones stands for the proposition that the predominate 
inquiry into a statement's testimonial character is whether there exists "an 
intent to bear witness.,,230 This is not a novel consideration. The courts in 
Castro-Davis and Saechao, while not doing so as heavily as the court in 
Jones, also considered the intentions of the declarant in the making of a 
statement. 231 
Consistent with the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Cooper v. 
State, it appears that the Fourth Circuit also views Williams as limited solely 
to Confrontation Clause inquiries involving forensic reports.232 Jones made 
absolutely no mention of the fragmented decision, despite having had the 
opportunity to do so. Jones very well could have cited the "accusation" test, 
because a declarant who "expect[ s] or intend[ s] to bear witness against 
another," oftentimes necessarily targets a "particular individual.,,233 
VI. PROPOSALS UNDER THE 2014 RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
Despite the manifest ambiguity in Justice Scalia's Crawford opinion, the 
present state of confrontation is even more abstruse than it was in 2004. 
Although Crawford sought to remedy the unpredictability of the prior 
Roberts standard,234 decisions like Williams and Derr II reveal the mission's 
utter failure.235 
The remainder of this comment will make recommendations as to how 
Maryland should proceed in its analysis of the Confrontation Clause, 
particularly in regard to jailhouse phone calls. These proposals will consider 
the case law available as of early 2014. Although the case of Hugh Wade 
will be referenced and its outcome refuted, it is debatable whether the ruling 
would have survived appellate scrutiny under the standards of 20 12. 
229 See Cox, 421 Md. at 647, 28 A.3d at 697 (discussing Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 779-
80). This may seem at odds with Bryant's mandate to consider the primary purpose 
of the State in a statement's making; however, because the Court of Appeals decided 
Cox after the Supreme Court's decision in Bryant, it may be argued that a lack of 
knowledge is dispositive in Maryland irrespective of the State's role in a statement's 
origin. See supra notes 34, 42. 
230 716 F.3d at 856. 
231 See supra Part lILA. 
232 See Cooper, 434 Md. at 234, 73 A.3d at 1122-23. 
233 See Jones, 716 F.3d at 856; Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion). 
234 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68. 
235 See supra Part IV. 
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A. How Maryland Should Define a Testimonial Statement 
After considering applicable Maryland and Supreme Court case law, in 
addition to the recent views of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, Maryland 
should define a testimonial statement as one that is made with the primary 
purpose of establishing facts of past events that are potentially relevant 
prosecutorially, in which a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would foresee as being available for later evidentiary use. Hence, there are 
two aspects to the proposed primary purpose inquiry, and while the two 
prongs can be viewed as separate, they do at times overlap. 
i. The evidentiary prong of the primary purpose test 
For the evidentiary prong, Maryland should adopt the recent views of the 
Fifth Circuit and the five Justices who oppose the plurality in Williams; i.e., 
whether a statement is "made for the primary purpose of establishing past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.,,236 This standard is 
entirely consistent with the goals of Crawford and does not reflect an 
element of accusation.237 This also coincides with Maryland precedent, as 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland spumed the Williams plurality in Derr 
11.238 
The Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses against the accused.,,239 
Thus the Fourth Circuit's standard is too narrow, as a declarant need not 
"intend to bear witness" against another, so long as the testimony is useful to 
the prosecution by establishing at least "one fact necessary for [a] 
conviction.,,24o To be sure, qualifying as a "witness" for confrontation 
purposes is not a tall task. 
ii. The foreseeability prong of the primary purpose test 
In addition to having a primary purpose that is evidentiary in nature, a 
testimonial statement must also reflect sufficient foreseeability. The 
common thread shared by the three "core classes" described in Crawford is 
that they all involve scenarios where a reasonable declarant would perceive 
the statement's potential for later evidentiary use,z41 In this regard, the 
Fourth Circuit's standard is again too narrow. A declarant need not "intend 
236 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
237 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68. 
238 See supra note 151. 
239 See supra note 3. 
240 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 995; cf Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
241 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
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or expect" that a statement be later used; rather, a reasonable declarant must 
merely foresee such potential.242 
B. How Maryland Should Apply the Sixth Amendment to Jailhouse Phone 
Calls 
i. An inmate's knowledge should be dispositive 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should not adopt the views of the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Instead, Maryland 
should view an inmate's knowledge that jailhouse phone calls are recorded 
as dispositive of a statement's testimonial character. Simply put, jailhouse 
phone calls fall under Crawford's third "core" class of testimonial 
statements, being "made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial. ,,243 
This scenario is distinguishable from Davis and Bryant, where the 
declarant's knowledge was not viewed as dispositive.244 There, the pertinent 
statements were non-testimonial because their primary purposes were not 
evidentiary in light of an apparent ongoing emergency.245 Thus the 
statements were non-testimonial regardless of the declarants' knowledge, as 
statements made in the course of genuine emergencies are for a primary 
purpose in which the right to confrontation is not concerned. 
In contrast, it is hard to think of a situation where a jailhouse phone call 
would be made for a non-evidentiary purpose. Surely, the vast majority 
would be expected to pertain to past events, and would not be for the primary 
purpose of seeking emergency assistance.246 
Relatedly, the Fourth Circuit in Jones held that the primary purpose of 
monitoring inmates' telephone conversations, from the point of view of jails 
and prisons, is non-evidentiary due to "significant institutional concerns.,,247 
Assuming the validity of this assertion, it is plausible that courts could 
overlook an inmate's knowledge on these grounds. However, while Bryant 
expressly authorized consideration of a "dual perspective,,,248 Maryland case 
law has made clear that more weight is to be attributed to the perspective of a 
statement's declarant.249 
242 Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 995; cf Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
243 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
244 See supra Part II.C-D. 
245 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1151-52. 
246 See supra note 84. 
247 Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
248 See supra Part 11.0. 
249 Cox, 421 Md. at 648-50, 28 A.3d at 697-99 (citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143). The 
Fourth Circuit also advocates a declarant driven approach. Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649. 
See also supra note 42. 
2014] When Does Crawford Reach Jailhouse Phone Calls? 191 
At the very minimum, Maryland should refuse to follow the First, Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits' description of jailhouse phone calls as "casual" 
. b . . 250 S I . , conversatIOns etween pnvate acquamtances. ure y, an Inmate s 
knowledge of the government's presence distinguishes jailhouse phone calls 
from other jailhouse scenarios. 
In short, even if Maryland courts were to fmd jailhouse phone calls non-
testimonial, the rationale for such a conclusion would be more credible by 
simply acknowledging the distinction between cases like Wade and cases 
like Cox, rather than trying to create an analogy where one does not exist. 
ii. A statement against penal interest is not a factor that should trump 
an intent to bear witness 
The reality is that courts do not view knowledge on jailhouse phone calls 
as dispositive, perhaps because it would just be too simple of an outcome for 
a progeny of Crawford. Maryland will therefore most likely weigh other 
applicable factors in addition to an inmate's knowledge, such as a statement 
against penal interest and an intent to bear witness. 
Under the fact specific situation involving a non-testifying co-defendant 
in a joint criminal trial, blatantly accusatory statements are, oftentimes also 
self-inculpatory.25\ This is because a co-defendant, in discussing another's 
involvement in a crime, necessarily reflects personal knowledge of the 
incident in which a co-defendant is also charged.252 Statements are 
"intrinsically inculpatory to the extent they demonstrate knowledge of 
'significant details about the crime. ",253 
Maryland should find the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dargan persuasive, 
insofar as a statement against penal interest is concerned.254 As with other 
hearsay exceptions grounded in inherent reliability, consideration of a 
statement against interest lacks textual support in the Sixth Amendment, and 
is inconsistent with the crux of the Confrontation Clause, cross-
examination.255 
In Dargan, an appeal out of the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a co-defendant's 
statement equated to a hearsay exception as a statement against penal 
interest.256 Although such a consideration would have only bolstered the 
250 See Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 65; Saechao, 249 Fed.App'x 678; Jones, 716 F.3d 
at 856. 
251 See, e.g., supra note 58. 
252 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649. 
253 Id. (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994)). 
254 See generally id. 
255 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68. 
256 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 650-51. 
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subsequent non-testimonial finding, it was completely ignored in the court's 
Sixth Amendment analysis.257 
Ironically, in its hearsay analysis, the court considered whether the co-
defendant had anything to gain under the circumstances and at the time that 
the particular statement was made.258 Specifically, whether there existed a 
"motive to shift blame or curry favor" called into question a statement's 
"self-inculpatory quality.,,259 Therefore, under the rules of evidence, an 
intent to bear witness against another retracts from the inherent reliability, 
and thus applicability, of a statement against penal interest. 
Although federal and state evidentiary rules are immaterial in regard to 
the application of constitutional rights,260 it is interesting to see the 
interaction of the two factors, relevant to inquiries in both contexts. At a 
minimum, it would seem to follow that where a non-testifying co-defendant 
has an "obvious motive to shift blame or curry favor,,,261 a statement's se1f-
inculpatory character warrants less weight, under either the rules of evidence 
or the Sixth Amendment. 
Despite the fact that Dargan disregarded a statement's self-inculpatory 
nature in its Confrontation Clause analysis/62 Maryland caselaw has not.263 
While there are arguments that support simply following the Fourth Circuit 
in this regard, at a minimum, Maryland should declare that a statement 
against penal interest does not trump an "intent to bear witness," where it is 
clear a co-defendant is attempting to negate personal guilt or shift blame 
towards an accomplice?64 
More simply put, where there is express notification of recording plus 
evidence of an accusatory intention, a statement on a jailhouse phone call is 
testimonial per se, even if inherently self-inculpatory. 
257Id. 
258 Id. See supra Part V.C. 
259 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649. 
260 See supra note 116. See also Crawford, 571 U.S. at 61 ("Where testimonial 
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth 
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of "reliability. "'). 
261 Dargan, 738 F.3d at 649. 
262 See id. at 649-51; but see Jones, 716 F.3d at 856. 
263 Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3d at 699 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89); see also 
Transcript of Motions Hearing at 39, State v. Wade, (2012) (No. 211273009). 
264 This is not to recommend that Maryland adopt any sort of "accusation" mandate 
in its Sixth Amendment analysis; this is simply to state that where such intent is 
present, a jailhouse phone call is testimonial per se. 
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iii. "Third category witnesses" are created when a statement against 
penal interest is dispositive 
Again, the general rationale for viewing a statement against penal interest 
as non-testimonial is that a reasonable declarant does not make such a 
statement when under the impression that it would be available for later 
prosecutorial use?65 This concerns the foreseeability prong of the primary 
purpose inquiry. The evidentiary prong is not at issue because the above-
rationale does not pertain to criminal relevance, but rather subsequent 
availability. 
Arguing that a statement against penal interest is dispositive may be 
construed as suggesting that a statement is not sufficiently accusatory for 
confrontation purposes, as a declarant does not intend to bear witness against 
another when a statement is also self-incriminating.266 That argument, 
however, was expressly rejected by the Court in Melendez-Diaz,267 and again 
by the five Justices who opposed the "accusation" test in Williams. 268 
The Williams plurality argued that DNA analysts were not "witnesses" in 
the historical sense, in part because DNA analysis is an impersonal scientific 
practice in which analysts compile reports without any sense of whether they 
will "be incriminating or exonerating.,,269 The dissent and Justice Thomas, 
however, rejected this perspective, reiterating that "the Sixth Amendment 
contemplates [ only] two classes of witnesses - those against the defendant 
and those in his favor ... there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to 
the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.'.27O 
Expressed differently, the plurality posited that the lab report was non-
testimonial because the DNA analysts did notforesee its later use at trial and 
thus "did not intend to bear witness against a particular individual.',271 
Clearly, the evidentiary prong was not at issue, as the report established facts 
relating to past events and potentially relevant to criminal prosecution.272 
265 Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 268. 
266 See supra note 128; see also Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 993-96. 
267 129 S. Ct. at 2533. 
268 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n Melendez-Diaz, we 
rejected a related argument that laboratory analysts are not subject to confrontation 
because they are not 'accusatory' witnesses." (internal citations omitted». 
269 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244 (plurality opinion). 
27°Id. at 2263 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313-
14). See also supra Part IV.B.iv. 
271 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion). 
272 That being said, the Williams plurality, however, did attempt to invoke the 
ongoing emergency exception to establish a non-evidentiary primary purpose, but 
this too was expressly rejected by a majority of the Court. See id. at 2243-44 
(plurality opinion) (asserting that the DNA report was compiled for a primary 
purpose of responding to an ongoing emergency because an unknown sexual 
predator was at large at the time the report was compiled); but see id. at 2263 
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In this regard, a statement against penal interest is akin to the 
"accusation" test, in that neither suggests a lack of criminal relevance, but 
rather pertains to foreseeability. The same can be said of the government's 
failed argument in Duron-Caldera, where it was alleged that the defendant's 
grandmother did not intend to bear witness against her grandson because she 
did not foresee the use of her immigration affidavit forty-years later at a 
criminal trial. 273 
Herein lies the distinction between a statement against penal interest and, 
for example, a statement made during a genuine emergency situation. The 
former has an evidentiary primary purpose, whereas the latter does not. As 
such, implication of the ongoing emergency exception, which was expressly 
carved out of the right to confrontation by the Court in Davis, is non-
testimonial because of its non-evidentiary nature.274 
A declarant is not a "witness" for confrontation fsurposes when a 
statement is made for a non-evidentiary primary purpose.2 5 For that reason, 
even though statements made in the course of an emergency may in fact be 
"helpful to the prosecution [yet] immune from confrontation," the pertinent 
declarants are not "third category witnesses," as described by the Court in 
Melendez-Diaz.276 
Statements against penal interest, on the other hand, when made by a co-
defendant while incarcerated pretrial, are typically made to establish facts 
relating to past events.277 Thus their primary purpose is very clearly 
evidentiary, and their testimonial character turns on foreseeability, just like 
the government's argument in Duron-Caldera, as well as the Williams 
plurality's "accusation" test.278 
In short, unless an explicit exception to the Confrontation Clause is 
carved out for statements against penal interest, as was done with ongoing 
emergencies, then the rationale in the case of Hugh Wade cannot stand.279 
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[I]t strains credulity to assert that the police and 
[laboratory] were primarily concerned with the exigencies of an ongoing emergency, 
rather than with producing evidence."); id at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("On their 
face, the [ongoing emergency] decisions have nothing to say about laboratory 
analysts conducting routine tests far away from a crime scene. And this case presents 
a peculiarly inapt set off acts for extending those precedents."). 
27 See supra Part IV.B.iv. 
274 To clarify, such a statement is not considered "non-evidentiary" for failing to 
establish facts of criminal relevance; rather, it is non-evidentiary because the 
primary purpose of the statement is not for that reason. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 814-
15. 
275 !d. 
276 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313-14. 
277 See supra note 84. 
278 See Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d at 992-93; Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
279 See supra Part III.B. 
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Such an exception, however, would not find support alongside the other 
exceptions to Crawford, which again are fundamentally non-evidentiary in 
nature,z80 Accordingly, if such an exception were to be expressly carved out 
by a Maryland court, it would undoubtedly be vulnerable to appellate 
scrutiny. 
iv. Factors grounded in inherent reliability should not circumvent a 
defendant's right to confrontation 
Furthermore, determining that a statement is non-testimonial because it is 
against penal interest resembles the practices under the former Roberts 
standard, in that a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses turns on 
judicial determinations of, in essence, the need for cross-examination.281 
This is precisely what Crawford sought to abrogate.282 Justice Scalia 
described cross-examination as a procedural guarantee of reliability, which 
Roberts misconstrued as substantive.283 
To rely on a statement against penal interest as the basis for a non-
testimonial finding would function as if the Sixth Amendment's aims were 
that of substantive reliability. In Williams, the plurality cited the inherent 
reliability of DNA analysis, arguing that it did not resemble the type of out-
of-court statements in which the Sixth Amendment's Framers were 
concemed.284 However, this interpretation was also rejected by a majority of 
the Supreme COurt:285 
It is not up to us to decide, ex ante, what evidence is 
trustworthy and what is not. That is because the 
Confrontation Clause prescribes its own "procedure for 
determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials." 
That procedure is cross-examination. And "[ d]ispensing 
with [it] because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
280 See supra note 267. 
281 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 ("Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge 
is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation."). 
282 I d. at 60-68. 
283 See id. at 61. 
284 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243-44 (plurality opinion). 
285Id. at 2275 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Both Justice 
Thomas's concurrence and the dissent cited Melendez-Diaz to reject the Williams 
plurality's reliance on the reliability of DNA testing. See, e.g., id. at 2261 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309-10) 
("The Confrontation Clause does not require that evidence be reliable, but that the 
reliability of a specific 'class of testimonial statements' - formalized statement 
bearing indicia of solemnity - be assessed through cross-examination."). 
196 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 44.2 
dispensing with a jury trial because a defendant is obviously 
guilty.,,286 
In other words, dispensing with cross-examination because DNA analysis is 
reliable reflects an overly narrow view of the right to confrontation, similar 
to that of the former Roberts standard. 
The Williams plurality argued that DNA testing is inherently reliable 
because there is no "prospect for fabrication," as it is "unlikely that a 
particular researcher has a defendant-related motive to behave 
dishonestly.,,287 However, this too was unequivocally rejected as overly 
narrow, because "the typical problem with laboratory analyses - and [thus] 
the typical focus of cross-examination - has to do with careless or 
incompetent work, rather than with personal vendettas.,,288 
The same logic applies to a statement against penal interest in the context 
of jailhouse phone calls. The assertion that a declarant does not intend to 
bear witness against another when a statement is self-inculpatory presents an 
overly narrow interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. It assumes that the 
sole concern of the Amendment's Framers was a declarant's devious intent. 
Obviously, the Confrontation Clause is broader than that, providing the right 
to cross-examine adverse witnesses in regard to much more than simply a 
declarant's motives.289 For example, other topics worthy of Sixth 
Amendment protection include a declarant's perception, recollection, etc.290 
More fundamentally, the Crawford court made clear that it would be 
inappropriate to preclude cross-examination on the basis of a self-
exculpatory statement being found sufficiently reliable.291 Specifically, the 
Court traced the right to confrontation back to its English common law 
routes and discussed the infamous 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: 
Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated 
him in an examination before the Privy Council and in a 
letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury .... 
Suspecting that Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded 
that the judges call him to appear. . .. The judges refused 
286 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
287 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250. 
288 Id. at 2274-75 (Kagan, 1., dissenting) ("Scientific testing is technical, to be sure; 
but it is only as reliable as the people who perform it. That is why a defendant may 
wish to ask the analyst a variety of questions: How much experience do you have? 
Have you ever made mistakes in the past? Did you test the right sample? Use the 
right procedures? Contaminate the sample in any way?" (internal citations 
omitted)). 
289 I d. 
290 See supra note 95. 
291 See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68. 
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. . .. [T]he jury convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to 
death.292 
197 
Sir Raleigh's case was one on which the Framers relied while drafting the 
Sixth Amendment.293 It was also again referenced in Crawford, as evidence 
of how Roberts had gotten away from the original intent behind the right to 
confrontation: 
The Raleigh trial itself involved the very sorts of reliability 
determinations that Roberts authorizes. In the face of 
Raleigh's repeated demands for confrontation, the 
prosecution responded with many of the arguments a court 
applying Roberts might invoke today: that Cobham's 
statements were self-inculpatory, that they were not made in 
the heat of passion, and that they were not "extracted from 
[him] upon any hopes or promise of Pardon." It is not 
plausible that the Framers' only objection to the trial was 
that Raleigh's judges did not properly weigh these factors 
before sentencing him to death. Rather, the problem was 
that the judges refused to allow Raleigh to confront Cobham 
in court, where he could cross-examine him and try to 
expose his accusation as a lie.294 
Applying this rationale to the case of Hugh Wade again reveals that the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City was in error when it found Adams' self-
inculpatory statement dispositive of non-testimonial intent.295 While it may 
remain subject to debate whether a statement against penal interest should be 
considered at all under Crawford, one thing is clear - such a factor does not, 
in and of itself, eviscerate one's right to confrontation. 
v. Jailhouse phone calls "resemble" custodial interrogation 
The strongest argument in favor of finding jailhouse phone calls non-
testimonial is the lack of express questioning or "formalized custodial 
interrogation.,,296 In addition to lying at the heart of Justice Thomas's 
analysis, the Crawford Court also expressly described the testimonial nature 
inherent in statements to police, as opposed to statements to private 
292 I d. at 44 (internal citations omitted). 
293 See id. 
294 Id. at 62 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
295 See supra Part lILB. 
296 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52; Cox, 421 Md. 648,28 A.3d at 697 (interpreting 
Supreme Court precedent to "strongly suggest that most, if not all, statements that 
are not made to state actors are non-testimonial"). 
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acquaintances.297 At a minimum, the relative lack of governmental 
involvement makes jailhouse phone calls distinguishable from other 
examples of "core" testimonial statements, such as confessions and grand 
jury testimony.298 
In Cooper, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied Justice Thomas's 
definition of formality and concluded that a DNA report was non-testimonial 
because it did not "result" from a police interrogation?99 Clearly, applying 
this rationale to jailhouse phone calls would also result in a non-testimonial 
finding. However, Justice Thomas did not require that testimonial 
statements "result" from formal interrogation.30o Rather, he defined a 
statement as testimonial if it constitutes "formalized dialogue" that merely 
resembles custodial interrogation.30 ! 
Through the lens of Justice Thomas, therefore, it is reasonable to assert 
that jailhouse phone calls are sufficiently formal for resembling custodial 
interrogation, which again is accomplished via an inmate's knowledge. 
Derr Irs adoption of Justice Thomas's definition of testimonial as the 
standard in Maryland was quite puzzling because no other member of the 
Supreme Court shared his views.302 Subsequently, Derr II was limited solely 
to forensic reports by the Court of Appeals of Maryland's opinion in 
Cooper.303 This effectively rendered the 2011 decision in Cox the applicable 
standard in Maryland for all other confrontation inquires.304 
Once more, the argument in favor of finding jailhouse phone calls 
testimonial under Bryant and Cox is that the calls are sufficiently formal 
given their custodial context, generally made for the primary purpose of 
recanting past events, rarely involve emergency situations, and are 
objectively viewed as a scenario in which the statement's substance would be 
available for later use at tria1.305 Moreover, because inmates are aware that 
their phone conversations are monitored, it can be said that certain 
297 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-53. 
298 I d. 
299 Cooper, 434 Md. at 231-36, 73 A.3d at 1121-24. 
300 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255-64 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
301/d. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough the [DNA] report was produced 
at the request of law enforcement, it was not the product of any sort of formalized 
dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.") (emphasis added). 
302 Derr II, 434 Md. at 141-42, 73 A.3d at 286 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003» ("If Justice Thomas's opinion in Williams 
did represent the holding of the Court, it is difficult to understand why no member of 
the plurality joined the Thomas opinion, or why Justice Thomas did not join a 
portion of the plurality opinion."). 
303 See supra Part IV.B.iii. 
304 See Cox, 421 Md. at 648-49, 28 A.3d at 298-99. 
305 See supra Part I1I.C. 
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statements are made for the "primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial 
testimony. ,,306 
vi. Policy considerations 
In Maryland, it is permissible in certain circumstances to try criminal 
defendants jointly for purposes of judicial economy.307 However, if a 
jailhouse phone call that is made by a non-testifying co-defendant and 
incriminating against another co-defendant is deemed to be testimonial in 
nature, then the Supreme Court's decision in Bruton v. United States is 
implicated.308 Though triggered solely by the Confrontation Clause/09 i.e., 
only if an out-of-court statement is testimonial, where applicable, Bruton 
provides a prejudiced co-defendant with either a severance, limiting 
instruction, or redaction of the pertinent out-of-court statement.310 
Without question, the ideal of judicial economy, though necessary in its 
own right, pales in comparison to rights of constitutional dimension.311 
Further, the directives of Bruton cannot be said to be overly burdensome, on 
either the State or the judiciary. 
Admittedly, there is no clear-cut answer to the principle issue addressed 
in this comment. For that reason, it would seem prudent for a court to tread 
carefully, and in an abundance of caution elect to safeguard fundamental 
liberties. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Crawford aimed to remedy the unpredictability of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence but its ambiguities have led to a state of confrontation no more 
predictable than the former Roberts standard. In regard to jailhouse phone 
calls, Maryland will have to decide whether to coin the calls "casual" 
conversations between acquaintances, or properly acknowledge the obvious 
governmental presence at play. 
It is the recommendation of this author that Maryland refrain from 
likening jailhouse phone calls to other, more private conversations in the 
context of jails and prisons. In doing so, an inmate's knowledge of recording 
should be dispositive of testimonial character, as the scenario resembles 
306 Cox, 421 Md. at 651, 28 A.3 d at 699. 
307 Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525,553,693 A.2d 781, 794 (1997). 308 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
309 See supra note 44; Dargan, 738 F.3d at 651 ("[M]ore significantly, Bruton, is 
simply irrelevant in the context of non-testimonial statements." (internal citation 
omitted)). 
310 See id; Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65-66 ("[T]he Bruton rule does not apply to 
non-testimonial hearsay statements."). 
3ll See generally Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion), 2256 (Thomas, J., 
concurring), 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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"formalized dialogue," similar to statements made directly to State actors 
during the course of an interrogation. Although the current trend has not 
found such knowledge dispositive, at a minimum, where there is a clear 
accusatory intent in addition to knowledge, Maryland should find a co-
defendant's jailhouse phone call testimonial, regardless of the statement's 
self-inculpatory nature. 
